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________________________________________________________
Introduction: Soering v. United Kingdom and the Modern
Landscape of the American Death Penalty
Around dinnertime in the early spring of 1985, the parents of Elizabeth Haysom
were stabbed to death in their Virginia home. Elizabeth was, by all accounts, a deeply
troubled young woman who had recently entered into a symbiotic relationship with Jens
Soering, an 18-year old German national also studying at the University of Virginia.
Subsequent investigation into the stabbings revealed that Soering had likely committed
the brutal acts at the behest of Elizabeth. Over one year later, Soering was indicted by a
grand jury in the Commonwealth of Virginia and charged with the murders.

At the time of Soering’s indictment, he and Elizabeth, having earlier fled to
Europe, were being detained in England on charges of check fraud. Soon after, the
United States invoked the relevant extradition treaty to request thatSoering be released
back to Virginia so that he could face his murder charges there. The United Kingdom,
cognizant of the fact that Soering would likely face the death penalty in Virginia whereas
capital punishment had since been abolished in Great Britain, paused to consider the
implications of extradition. The Embassy issued a request to the United States asking for
assurance that in the case of Soering’s extradition to the U.S., appropriate authorities of
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the Commonwealth of Virginia would be alerted not to pursue Soering’s execution.
Indeed, no such assurances were made, and despite the issuance of a similar extradition
application from Germany, the U.K. continued to consider the United State’s request.

When at last the United Kingdom’s Secretary of State reluctantly agreed to sign a
warrant ordering Soering’s surrender, Soering appealed to the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR.) As it happened, while the extradition requests were pending the British
proceedings had generated a substantial amount of psychiatric evidence calling into
question Soering’s maturity and mental state. More significantly,Soering had fashioned
a novel new claim that in the event the U.K. extradited him to Virginia and it resulted in
his incarceration on death row there, it would be the functional equivalent of the U.K.
exposing Soering to psychological torture and would thus violate Article 3 of the
European Convention of Human Rights providing that “[n]o one shall be subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

Interestingly, the tenor of Soering’s argument rested in an emerging legal concept
he identified as “death row phenomenon.” The claim was thata “syndrome” manifests
itself when persons are forced to endure the extreme conditions of death row and the
lengthy delays which accompany it—usually six to eight years at that time in Virginia
according to the ECHR, depending on the number of appeals a defendant decided to
pursue. Soering maintained that “during [this] time he would be subject to increasing
tension and psychological trauma… his future detention on ‘death row’… where he
expects to be the victim of violence and sexual abuse because of his age, colour and
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nationality; and the constant spectre of execution itself, including the ritual of
execution.”1

The ECHR considered this and other claims, and in a landmark decision on July
7, 1989, it concluded that implementation of Soering’s extradition under these
circumstances would indeed violate Article 3 of the Convention.2 While explaining that
the American institution of the death penalty could still be squared with democratic
ideals, the Court was nevertheless persuaded by the notion that “the condemned prisoner
has to endure for many years the conditions on death row and the anguish and mounting
tension of living in the ever-present shadow of death.”3 (Emphasis added.) Taking
account of the length of time someone in Virginia must remain on death row as well as
more immediate concerns regarding Soering’s age and mental condition, the ECHR
determined that extradition with possible exposure to death row would implicate evolving
mores of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment.
***

Is there a point at which a person’s tenure on death row has lasted so long or has
become so stressful that his sentence begins to violate the Constitution? The language of
our own Eighth Amendment very much reflects those same values embodied in Article 3
of the European Convention. That said, the Soering decision has several times proven
important in the American context, and will likely take on new significance as average
tenures on death row grow exponentially and Eighth Amendment jurisprudence continues
to evolve.
1
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Since the practice of capital punishment in the United States was reinstated in
1976,4 the claim that prolonged incarceration on death row could violate Eighth
Amendment notions of “cruel and unusual punishment” has only appeared a handful of
times in state supreme courts. In the 1999 case Knight v. Florida, the United States
Supreme Court consolidated two of these cases on appeal from Florida and Nebraska.
The majority opinion denied certiorari on the issue, which had by now gained notoriety
as the Lackey claim,5 with Justice Thomas concurring that delays are an inevitable
function of our procedures for safeguarding the death penalty. Although the two
petitioners in Knight had been on death row for nearly 20 and 25 years respectively, he
reasoned that a lengthyamount of time alone could not render a prisoner’s punishments
cruel and unusual.6 Thomas intimated that most delays in execution are the result of an
inmate’s own decisions to exhaust appeals, and therefore granting certiorari here would
only provide incentives for offenders to manipulate the appeals process. Where in
Lackey v. Texas Justice Stevens had invited state courts to serve as “laboratories” to test
the viability of such a constitutional argument,7 Justice Thomas now submitted that “the
Court should consider the experiment concluded.”8

In a vigorous dissent, Justice Breyer questioned the retributive and deterrent
justifications for imposition of the death penalty in cases where defendants had already
4
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been detained on death row for several decades.9 Breyer proceeded to catalogue the way
in which various foreign courts had interpreted legal standards comparable to those
embodied in our own constitution—including the ECHR in theSoering case—and had
found lengthy delays in otherwise lawful executions to have the potential for being
impermissibly inhumane.10 He also took issue with the characterization that this
constitutional question had been definitively resolved in the state-level laboratory, instead
asserting that very few courts had directly addressed the Eighth Amendment implications
in cases where the state could be said to bear some of the responsibility for an offender’s
prolonged incarceration. Therefore, Breyer argued that “although the experiment may
have begun, it is hardly evident that we ‘should consider the experiment concluded.’”11

Since Knight, the Supreme Court has handed down two momentous decisions
vindicating abolitionist principles in the area of the death penalty. In 2003, Justice
Stevens, writing for a majority in Atkins v. Virginia, held that executing mentally retarded
person violates the “cruel and unusual” clause of the Eighth Amendment.12 In 2005,
Stevens announced that the Eighth Amendment also prohibits imposing the death penalty
on juvenile offenders in Roper v. Simmons.13 Both opinionsrefer to “evolving standards
of decency”14 considerations necessitating prohibition of death sentences in certain
circumstances, with an eye towards international ideals.
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Whereas over the last five years the Eighth Amendment has substantially chipped
away at the constitutionally permissible parameters of capital punishment, the current
legal landscape surrounding the death penalty may be poised for more upheaval. Because
so few courts have squarely addressed the validity of such a claim
, and because there is
strong indication that unusually long exposure on death row could implicate evolving
standards of decency, our courts should re-explore the merits of a Lackey challenge. The
first step is convincing courts to recognize the “cruel and unusual” implications of the
“death row phenomenon,” explained in Part I by a closer examination of death row
conditions, death penalty justifications, and foreign opinion surrounding the issue of
delay. If the courts do decide to acknowledge the potential of such a claim, the next step
is to then identify the line at which a constitutional confinement on death row becomes
unconstitutionally lengthy. Part II discusses the many considerations which must factor
into this sort of delicate balancing act, so that state legislatures and courts alike can guard
against future Eighth Amendment violations in a system where efficiency may be at odds
with decency.

I.
Cruel and Unusual Punishment:
The Case for Death Row Phenomenon
The Eighth Amendment does not support the execution of persons in instances
where certain social principles will not be vindicated by imposition of the death penalty.
Moreover, questions regarding cruelty and unusual treatment are raised when
punishments become so heinous or barbarous that they fall outside the bounds of
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constitutionality. As outlined below, conditions of death row confinement can be so
psychologically taxing that prolonged exposure often proves torturous on the prisoner,
provoking legitimateEighth Amendmen t concerns. Such concerns have become
increasingly commonplace in the international community, and lend credibility to the
notion of a death row phenomenon and the legal legitimacy of an Eighth Amendment
claim where inmates are languishing for several decades awaiting execution.

A. Death Penalty Justifications, Eighth Amendment Limits, and J.B. Hubbard

Any interpretation of the scope of the Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual
punishment” provision will turn on “its text, by considering history, tradition, and
precedent, and with due regard for its purpose and function in the constitutional
design.”15 The Supreme Court realizes that the reach of the Eighth Amendment is not
fixed or precise; rather, “[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing
less than the dignity of man … The Amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”16

In 2004, J.B. Hubbard became the oldest person to be executed in over six
decades in the United States.17 At the time of the Alabama execution, the twiceconvicted murderer was 74 years-old and had spent 27 years on death row. The
Washington Post reported that prior to his execution, Hubbard suffered from colon and
prostate cancer, hypertension, and “spasms of dementia,” and that his health was so
15
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deteriorated that his fellow death row inmates often had to help bathe him and wash his
hair.18

Hubbard’s execution highlighted mounting tensions surrounding a nationwide
system in which lengthy appeals often result in inordinately long decays on death row.
Hours before Hubbard’s death, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on his last petition
for a stay of execution by just a five-to-four margin, indicating that there was at least a
palpable argument that executing a man in these circumstances had the potential for
being constitutionally problematic.19 After the execution, even the district attorney
prosecuting Hubbard’s case exclaimed to a reporter “[i]t’s ridiculous—unconscionable—
for any process to take this long.”20

At the time the Constitution was drafted, the Framers were familiar with a system
where the interim between conviction and execution would be a matter of days or weeks,
not years or decades.21 Our contemporary system of capital punishment has since
undergone a variety of reforms, most of which have been targeted at restricting a practice
many characterize as being arbitrary in its administration. Undoubtedly, increasingly
long appeals and prolonged detentions on death row are the inevitable consequences of
providing additional procedures to safeguard the area of the death penalty. Justice
Thomas noted as much when he denied the Eighth Amendment claim in Knight v.
Florida, announcing that it would be “incongruous to arm capital defendants with an
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arsenal of ‘constitutional’ claims with which they may delay their executions, and
simultaneously to complain when executions are invariably delayed.”22

However, while the Supreme Court has several times denied certiorari on this
issue, Justices Breyer and Stevens have often dissented, parsing the terms “cruel” and
“unusual” to conclude that this question fairly deserves addressing in instances where
delays on death row reach an abnormal magnitude.23 Hubbard’s execution in particular
illustrates that in certain cases it might not be reasonable to assume that that such long
death row delays always comport with the constitution or with the social purposes
underwriting the death penalty.

When the Supreme Court in 1976 announced the death penaltydid not uniformly
violate the Eighth Amendment in Gregg v. Georgia, thus ending a 10 year moratorium on
the practice, it emphasized that capital punishment is constitutionally justified by two
principles: deterrence and retribution.24 In the situation where an ailing 74-year old man
has already spent twenty-seven years on death row, however, it is difficult for any
observer to discern how his execution definitively serves either social purpose. The state
can arguably be said to have already furthered its retributive goals by subjecting the
offender to endure almost three decades in near-solitary confinement, perhaps
constituting a separate punishment distinct from execution, which begins to implicate
notions of double-jeopardy. The state will also need to establish that deterrence
principles are vindicated by imposition of the death penalty. Once again, this burden will
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be hard to make in instances where the state has determined to kill a man so feeble at the
time of his execution that he is unable even to wash his own hair.

B. Conditions of Confinement: Death Row Syndrome and The Ross Case

Soering’s portrait of a so-called “death row phenomenon” has achieved new
relevance in light of extreme fact-patterns like Hubbard’s and relatively sympathetic
opinion by Justices Stevens and Breyers in similar cases.25 The Department of Justice
reported that capital offenders in the United States between 1977 and 2004 had spent an
average of ten years and two months on death row anticipating execution, up seven
months from the average calculated from 1977-2003.26 That same document also
reported that the number of actual executions had marginally decreased in 2004, those
figures illustrating a system that is only getting more clogged and unworkable as time
progresses. As more and more prisoners languish for unprecedented lengths of time on
death row, more situations like Hubbard’s will inevitably emerge and spark debate.

The Death Penalty Information Center reports that those inmates stuck in limbo
may spend up to 23 hours a day alone in their cell.27 The Supreme Court has said that
this time spent awaiting death is generally characterized by unnerving uncertainty about
when or how the an execution will take place, constituting “one of the most horrible
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feelings to which [a person] can be subjected…”28 Justice Breyer has directly called
attention to the viability of this assertion, asserting that “it is difficult to deny the
suffering inherent in a prolonged wait for execution—a matter which courts and judges
have long recognized.”29 The dissent to denial of certiorari in Knight cites other judicial
opinion calling attention to the “dehumanizing effects” of long periods spent on death
row which take “a frightful toll” on inmates, often resulting in an “onset of insanity.”30 A
study of Florida prisoners cited by Breyer, found that 42% of persons on death row had
seriously considered suicide and 35% had actually attempted it, demonstrating that
psychological instability wrought by extended periods awaiting execution is a serious
issue.31

No recent case more compellingly demonstrates the legal import of this
phenomenon than the Connecticut case State v. Ross. In January of 2005, just one hour
before Michael Ross was set to die for murders he committed in 1984, Connecticut
decided to stay his execution pursuant to last-minute motions filed by Ross’ lawyer
alleging that his client was suffering from death row syndrome.32 Ross, having spent
much of death row in solitary confinement, had long-insisted he was competent to
volunteer for execution and had thus waived all further appeals of his sentence. In a
series of dramatic events at the eleventh hour, his lawyer issued a statement saying that
“new and significant evidence has come to light that I simply cannot ignore” regarding
Ross’s competency to waive his appeals, suggesting instead that prison conditions had
28
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coerced Ross into a suicidal state.33 This evidence came in the form of a letter from
another inmate who had spoken to Ross through vents and had heard him describe certain
prison workers as “sociopaths in disguise” “engineering” Ross’ will to die, in addition to
other affidavits from individuals suggesting that Ross was suffering from death row
syndrome and that his acute levels of despair and depression were inciting him to commit
suicide through execution.34 A former warden corroborated that it wasn’t abnormal for
prison staff to comment that it would be easier on everybody if death row inmates just
killed themselves.35 He further testified that the atmosphere in the Connecticut prison’s
death row resembled “living in a submarine or cave.”36 In fact, Michael Ross had already
attempted to kill himself on three different occasions.37

While Ross’s lawyer was able to successfully secure another competency hearing
to determine whether his client retained the proper mental state to elect to die, the court
ultimately found that Ross was fit to volunteer for execution In the course of its
determination, however, the court specified that the only “colorable claim” advanced by
Ross’s lawyers was that Ross might be suffering from death row syndrome, a seeming reinvitation to explore the weight of the Soering decision as applied in the American
context.38 Characterizing death row syndrome as a legal concept that may or may not
exist, the court nonetheless entertained court papers prepared by psychiatrist and former
Harvard Medical Professor Dr. Stuart Grassian stating:
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The conditions of confinement are so oppressive, the helplessness endured in the
roller coaster of hope and despair so wrenching and exhausting, that ultimately
the inmate can no longer bear it, and then it is only in dropping his appeals that
he has any sense of control over his fate…”39

The Connecticut Supreme Court, deciding that Michael Ross was competent to waive his
appeals, ruled to reinstate his execution, and on May 13, 2005, he became the first person
executed by a state in New England in 45 years.40 At the time of his execution, Michael
Ross had spent upwards of 17 years on death row.41

State v. Ross is an interesting study in several respects. First, Ross illustrates
potential judicial discomfort concerning competency when condemned prisoners
volunteer to die. There is a fine line between the constitutional scenario where an inmate
competently waives his appeals, and the unconstitutional scenario in which an inmate,
having been exposed to intensely long periods of near-solitary confinement, is no longer
able to stand his conditions and desperately waives his appeals in order to put an end to
his own anguish. Tellingly, the chain of events resulting in Ross’s final litigation was
actually sparked by Robert N. Chatigny, a U.S. District Court judge who was so
concerned that Michael Ross’s mental state might fall in this latter, unconstitutional
category that he threatened to disbar Ross’s lawyer if he didn’t adequately investigate
new evidence regarding his client’s psychological soundness.42 Such unease on the part
of judges has broad implications for opening the way for new discussion of death row
syndrome.
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Second, Ross is compelling in the sense that it was not Ross himself promulgating
the Soering argument. Ross was willing to die and had said as much on several
occasions. Unlike the scenario Justice Thomas had envisioned in Knight, Ross’s 17-year
incarceration on death row and subsequent death row syndrome claim was not the
product of a prisoner’s attempt to exploit his appeals and then complain about the delay.
Here, it was the government intervening to assess the impact of death row conditions on
Ross’s mental state. Ross, in contrast, was trying to put an end to the delay and speed up
the execution. Perhaps Connecticut’s demonstrated reluctance to impose the capital
punishment here was atypical of states, given that Connecticut had not executed anyone
since the death penalty was reinstated. However, this case at least lends credence to
Breyer’s contention that Eighth Amendment inquiries could become relevant where
prolonged delays are not directly attributable to the prisoner.

For the foregoing reasons, the death row phenomenon presents at least a workable
Eighth Amendment challenge to enforcement of the death penalty in certain cases. This
will turn on a combination of factors, including but not limited to the length of time
someone has spent awaiting execution, the particular reasons for the delay, and a mental
state examination of the prisoner. In any event, the Court has long recognized that the
miserable nature and conditions on death row often inflict a significant degree of
psychological harm on inmates. This has implicit Eighth Amendment importance that
deserves thoughtful consideration in fact-patterns where long delays have rendered
punishments barbarous.
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C. International Support forthis “Cruel and Unusu al Punishment” Challenge

Guidance from foreign courts lends considerable support for the notion that death
row syndrome can provide the foundation for a viable Eighth Amendment “cruel and
unusual punishment” challenge at home. It seems that the Supreme Court, in the wake of
Atkins and Roper, would be amenable to considering the opinion of international courts if
it was to grant certiorari on this claim. The reasons are twofold: 1) because several
foreign courts with constitutions like ours have directly and carefully addressed this issue
in considerably more detail than our courts have, and 2) because an increasing number of
countries are refusing to extradite offenders to the United States precisely because they
have held our notoriously long death row delays violate perceived international standards
of human rights.

The Eighth Amendment was molded out of a corresponding provision of the
English Declaration of Rights of 1689.43 When deciding that the Constitution now
forbids execution of juvenile offenders, Justice Kennedy drew the Court’s attention to the
fact the England had long ago abolished this practice, noting that “The United Kingdom’s
experience bears particular relevance here in light of the historic ties between our
countries and in light of the Eight Amendment’s own origins.”44 That said, British Jurists
have found that inordinate delays awaiting execution invariably violates the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishments contained in Section 10 of that document.45
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Historically speaking, those conclusions should be highly instructive to our immediate
inquiry.

While Justice Breyer recognized that foreign law does not bind the U.S. Supreme
Court, he nonetheless conceded that reviewing corresponding foreign decisions can be
very probative in assisting our own evaluation of novel constitutional claims. His Knight
dissent of denial of certiorari cited various instances in which the Court had in fact
consulted the opinions of other countries—“courts that accept or assume the lawfulness
of the death penalty”—to aid in its own interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s
limitations.46 In ruling on the constitutionality of practices such as the execution of
juvenile offenders, the doctrine of felony murder, death penalty for rape, and the death
penalty for mentally retarded, United States courts have often consulted the opinions of
other former Commonwealth countries “insofar as those opinions reflect a legal tradition
that also underlies our own Eighth Amendment.”47 In view of that, international opinion
counsels that the United States should take evolving international standards of decency
into consideration to find that the Eighth Amendment bans lengthy detentions on death
row.

This concept is no doubt controversial. Amicus curia by the European Union in
Atkins no doubt impressed Justice Stevens that the world community “overwhelmingly”
disapproved of the use of capital punishment against mentally retarded by 2001.48 In
perhaps one of the lengthiest expositions on international consensus, Justice Kennedy’s
46
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2005 opinion in Roper painted a stark portrait of America standing “alone in a world that
has turned its face against the juvenile death penalty.”49 Of course both of these recent
opinions were met with biting dissents by Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and
the now-deceased Justice Rehnquist.50 Justice O’Connor, also dissenting in Roper,
nevertheless qualified her dissent to agree with the majority that foreign and international
law are appropriate resources in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence because of that
Amendment’s unique character meant for “measuring the maturing values of civilized
society.”51 In any event, with Rehnquist and O’Connor now gone and two new Justices
on the Court, the majorities in both Atkinsand Roper are still preserved—Justices Breyer,
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsberg agreeing that the Eighth Amendment puts
specific prohibitions on the death penalty. Because there is supporting evidence of
consensus in the world community favoring a Lackey-type claim, there is a substantial
and distinct possibility that a Roberts-led Court would be similarly persuaded to accept
this argument in a grant of certiorari.

As mentioned previously, the Court also has functional reasons for reconsidering
a Lackey argument, more directly invoking the legacy of Soering. Extradition concerns
related to the European Court of Human Rights decision helped prompt Breyer’s 1998
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dissent of certiorari denial in Elledge v. Florida.52 Likewise, he again dissented to a
similar certiorari denial in 2002, noting that the Supreme Court of Canada had just ruled
that possible prolonged incarceration on death row was “a relevant consideration” in
deciding whether or not extradition to the United States would violate “principles of
‘fundamental justice.’”53 The prospect of Canada taking inordinate delays into account in
extradition decisions has significant implications for the United States, given that we are
Canada’s major extradition partner. Data suggested that the U.S. accounted for 83% of
the extradition requests received by Canada between 1985 and1991.54 The import of the
Soering decision is particularly salient here, as Canada is separated from the United
States by only a land border, making it an accessible destination for fleeing felons. Our
criminal justice system would be severely frustrated were it not able to try its worst
offenders in our own court systems simply because those offenders had absconded north.

Hence, there are practical as well as ideological reasons why the Court should
find a constitutional abuse if it were to grant certiorari on this issue. The changing
composition of the Court does not seem to have shifted the balance of Justices willing to
look towards consensus in the world community—particularly towards those countries
that reflect our constitutional design—in order to evaluate the unique parameters of the
Eighth Amendment. That said, foreign opinion favors identifying a human rights
violation at some point in a prisoner’s stay on death row, especially where lengthy delays
inhibit the United State’s ability to prosecute some of its worst offenders.
52
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II.
Putting This Challenge Into Action:
Considerations for Courts and Legislatures
Having already concluded that extremely long tenures on death row implicate
notions of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, we are
now tasked with the challenge of figuring out how to legally prevail with such an
argument. State courts and legislatures have offered us little guidance in this arena, their
silence serving only to highlight potential anxieties that must be addressed in any attempt
to govern this claim. Assuming that courts should approach this as a matter of first
impression, and assuming that the death penalty itself is constitutional pursuant to Gregg
v. Georgia, then particularly thorny is the job of identifying the specific point at which a
permissible incarceration on death row becomes cruel and unusual. This article submits
that there is no such bright line, only relevant factors with which prudent courts and
legislatures can reasonably assess when an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred.

A. Why Courts Should Evaluate this Claim as a Matter of First Impression

Eighth Amendment determinations normally rest on gauging where evolving
standards of decency lie; in this vein, Atkins and Roper both sought to examine evidence
of national consensus across states to aid thei r inquiry. This is not so easily accomplished
in our investigation. As discussed earlier, Knight only briefly addressed the feasibility of
a “cruel and unusual punishment” claim in instances where a prisoner had been awaiting
19

execution on death row for an unusually long period of time. In many respects, this is an
issue of first impression and courts should reexamine it with a clean slate.

It remains true that death row syndrome alone has not yet convincedany
American court to overturn a death sentence.55 Justice Thomas insinuated that this
argument was effectively dead, citing eight cases between the 1995 Lackey opinion and
his 1999 Knight concurrence that had rejected similar claims.56 However, the eight cases
he cited only handled Lackey claims involving six states.57 In fact, in at least one of these
cases Thomas referred to, the state and federal courts decided not to accept the Lackey
claim simply because there was a lack of precedent directing them to grant relief.58

Data about the practice of the death penalty across the country does not help us
predict with any certainty where states stand on this issue. At the time of this writing, the
District of Columbia and twelve states have expressly abolished the death penalty.59 Five
others have not executed anyone since 1976.60 Of this second group, New Hampshire
currently has no one on death row, and New York and Kansas declared their death
penalty statutes unconstitutional in 2004.61 An additional thirteen states haveeach
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executed less than five persons in the last 29 years,62 and thirteen states with capital
punishment still on the books have death row populations of 10 persons or fewer.63
These figures indicate that at least fourteen states—the twelve without the death penalty
and the two which just held their death penalty statutes unconstitutional—would probably
be amenable to an Eighth Amendment claim that prolonged incarceration on death row
could constitute cruel and unusual punishment, if such a claim were to reach them. Aside
from this projection however, there are very few indications thatstate courts have
seriously considered these Eighth Amendment claims to render this a settled issue.

This may be due in part to the fact that tenures on death row are just now reaching
unprecedented levels as we get further away from 1976’s reinstatement of capital
punishment and the length of death row residencies continues to inflate. An accurate
portrait of the national consensus is also probably obscured by the fact that there are
eighteen states thathave not outright abolished the death penalty but have nevertheless
invoked it with relative infrequency (if at all); similarly, there are several other states
with relatively small death row populations that have simply not encountered this issue.
All of these factors have resulted in alarmingly few opportunities for state courts to reach
the merits of this kind of argument, and have instead largely relegated the Lackey claim
to courts in states like California, Florida, and Texas with larger death row populations
and therefore more languishing prisoners. As such, gauging the national consensus in
this arena has become a challenging—if impossible—task.
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As Justice Breyer pointed out, there were no cases between 1995 and 1999 that
dealt substantially with the significance of an Eighth Amendment claim where the state
bore some responsible for the unusual delay.64 Consequently, there was very little
evidence of state consensus on that issue when the court denied certiorari without much
elaboration in Knight. Since then, many lower-level decisions have again neglected to
reach the merits of that sort of claim because of reliance on the Supreme Court, assuming
the issue is well-settled because certiorari was denied. Subsequent cases raising this
brand of “cruel and unusual punishment” argument in Idaho, Mississippi, Illinois, Indiana
and Utah have had no success because courts have refused to entertain the claim due to
strict adherence to Knight, which wasn’t even a ruling on the merits.65,66

Thus, this issue is really one of first impression. Only a handful of states actually
heard this kind of claim before Knight virtually precluded it, and of those states which
have considered it, very few have actually written extensively on its merits. There is even
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less precedent in the case of a state bearing some responsibility for an inmate’s
unconstitutionally long stay on death row. The simple reality is that more states than not
haven’t encountered this issue and are now barred from seriously considering it. This
will continue to pose problems as we get further away from the Gregg decision and stays
on death row continue to reach unprecedented levels. This will be particularly
problematic in those states which have declined to carry out many executions but have
retained substantial death row populations.

B. Courts, the Bright-Line Problem and the Speedy Trials Analog

Again, assuming the death penalty itself is not unconstitutional and that a
thorough appeals process assures that capital punishment is administered less arbitrarily,
then courts and legislatures must be able to identify the point at which a justifiable
tenancy on death row crosses over into the cruel and unusual if they are to regard this
kind of claim. In Atkins and Roper, the Court could measure the “direction and
consistency” of evolving standards of decency by looking at which states had enacted or
abolished statutes governing the use of the death penalty on mentally retarded and
juvenile offenders. The Lackey claim has no comparable legislative or common law
starting-point. Because there are no statutes to look towards, and because there is no
clear higher court precedent on this issue, courts must look elsewhere to determine when
they may step in and say enough is enough. The Speedy Trials cases provide some
relevant insights into how the courts can approach this sort of nuanced balancing.
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In the 1972 case Barker v. Wingo, the Supreme Court examined the “speedy
trials” clause of the Sixth Amendment67 to address the issue of whether it was
unconstitutional to bring a man to trial five years after his initial arrest. In granting
certiorari, the Court noted that “the right to speedy trial is a more vague concept than
other procedural rights. It is … impossible to determine with precision when the right
has been denied. We cannot definitely say how long is too long in a system where justice
is supposed to be swift but deliberate.”68 Similar to the dilemma posed by the vague
parameters of the Eighth Amendment Lackey claim, speedy trial challenges ask courts to
consider public justice as well as the individual rights of the defendant. The Court
declined to set a fixed length of time at which delays awaiting trial would be
automatically considered unconstitutional, opting instead for a “functional analysis of the
right in the particular context of the case.”69

Barker announced the Court was to adopt a flexible approach on an ad hoc basis:
“a balancing test in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are
weighed.”70 These factors to be considered included the length of the delay, the reason
for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.71
These last two factors are probably not as relevant to our immediate inquiry, as the
defendant’s assertion of his right to the challenge does not extend as readily to our
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situation and given the fact that his Lackey claim would be litigated in post-conviction
proceedings. It is, however, helpful to examine the other two Speedy Trials factors to
inform our Eighth Amendment determinations.

1. Length of Delay
Looking at the “speedy trials” clause of the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court
pronounced that the length of delay awaiting trial would serve as a “triggering
mechanism” for this brand of constitutional challenge.72 The Justices noted that the
particular circumstances of the case must be evaluated in order for the length of delay to
trigger scrutiny here, as longer delays might be more justifiable in certain circumstances.
Likewise, they explained that the Court is not required to investigate the merits of such a
claim “until there is some delay that is presumptively prejudicial.”73 The Court has never
been clear about what amount of time renders a delay presumptively prejudicial in the
Sixth Amendment context, although the Court found that an 8 ½ year holdup between the
indictment and arrest of the defendant in Doggett v. United States was “extraordinary,”
noting more generally that delays are presumptively prejudicial at least when they near a
year.74

Concededly, the criteria for a deciding how long is too long in the death row
scenario is different than in the speedy trials situations, although the process of
attempting to gauge the imprecise requires a similar approach. Certainly a year on death
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row will not prompt the Courts to examine this sort of Eighth Amendment challenge, for
accuracy of death penalty administration requires appellate safeguards that ensure
executions will rarely occur that soon after initial sentencing. While courts will want to
look at the particular procedural history of each death penalty case raising this claim, the
need to evaluate the length of delay on an ad hoc basis is probably not as pressing since
each individual raising this claim remains under the same sentence of death. Again,
prejudice is also not so much the determinative factor in a Lackey type claim because in
our case the petitioner’s trial has already occurred. The Barker considerations are still
highly instructive here however, insofar as this claim must attach to a presumptively long
delay in order to trigger judicial attention. We the then must figure out what constitutes a
presumptively long delay in the death row context.

The European Union refused to extradite Jans Soering because of a presumption
that Virginia’s average of six to eight years on death row was too long; that court did not,
however, qualify its holding to suggest what length of detention before execution would
have been permissible. While American abolitionists would likely perceive any amount
of time on death row to be a violation of the Eighth Amendment, death penalty
proponents of the Justice Thomas ilk would reject the notion that any fixed amount of
time could be presumptively inordinate. That said, a workable standard will have to fall
somewhere between those extremes if it is to achieve any real credibility within the
courts. In that sense, it is probably least objectionable to proceed with a determination
that seeks to discover where the outer limits of acceptability lie—thatis, we must identify
that point at which it becomes patently obvious that a delayhas becomeexceptionally
long, based on averages across the country.
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Dwight Aarons, an American scholar who has closely examined this area, has
suggested that we can classify a length of confinement on death row as “inordinate” at
least once the delay reaches twice the national average for persons executed in the United
States.75 Aarons’ proposal is particularly compelling in light of the fact that the Lackey
challenge turns on an examination of the cruel and “unusual,” since twice the national
average would seem fairly unusual by most accounts. This is not to say that periods of
less than that average are not unconstitutional under this framework; some would argue
that any delay in excess of the national average would be inordinate. However flawed,
Aarons’ modelnevertheless provides us with a practicable starting point because it allows
us to assume what is patently inordinate and work backwards. Applying the current
statistics gathered by the Death Penalty Information Center then, this approach would
provide courts with the power to hear an Eighth Amendment claim at least when a
prisoner has spent twenty years and four months on death row.

Even proceeding from this relatively conservative outer-limit, it becomes quickly
evident that the demand for an avenue of relief in this area is staggering. The United
States Department of Justice statistics reveal that of the 7,187 people sentenced to death
since 1977, over 50% of them are still lagging on death rows nationwide.76 This figure
breaks down in a drastic way at the individual state-level, particularly as we observe
states like California which retain death row populations at rates inconsistent with their
actual executions. With 648 persons awaiting execution there, the largest death row
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population of any state in thecountry ,77 California has executed a dozen people since it
resumed the practice of capital punishment in 1978.78 The Death Row Tracking records
of The California Department of Corrections reveal of those 648 people, 106 of them
have been on death row since 1985 or before.79 That means there are currently 106
people in California alone whose time spent on death row would presumptively trigger an
Eighth Amendment investigation under the conservative length-of-delay standard
propagated here.

The argument for establishing a presumptive triggering device is more compelling
in light of these kinds of trends, as sheer utility counsels that emerging crises like the one
in California must allow courts to step in at some point and decide when the imposition
of life in prison might be constitutionally warranted in place of a death sentence.
Beginning with the presumption that delays are at least unreasonably long when they
reach twice the national average, Courts may proceed to examine in more detail the
particulars of the case. Without such a mechanism in place, death row residencies will
continue to reach unimaginable levels, overloaded state systems will see their resources
drained, and further Eighth Amendment concerns will be implicated.
2. Reason for Delay
Returning to the Speedy Trials analog, Barker instructed that after a certain delay
is held to be presumptively excessive, courts may begin to examine the government’s
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reasons for the holdup in order to make their ruling on constitutionality. “Here, too,
different weights should be assigned to different reasons.”80 The Court clarified: “A
deliberate attempt to delay … should be weighted heavily against the government. A
more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less
heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such
circumstances must rest with the government and not with the defendant.”81 It also states
that reasons for delay which pertain to ensuring the accuracy of the proceedings, such as
attempting to find a missing witness, would be valid and legitimate for the government to
justify putting off trial.82

This Eighth Amendment challenge will also need to survey the interests of both
sides in its consideration. Justice Stevens suggested as much in Lackey, when hefirst
proposed that this kind of claim might be able to hold water in courts: “It may be
appropriate to distinguish, for example, among delays resulting from (a) a petitioner's
abuse of the judicial system by escape or repetitive, frivolous filings; (b) a petitioner's
legitimate exercise of his right to review; and (c) negligence or deliberate action by the
State.”83

As noted elsewhere in this paper, a prisoner’s own attempt to manipulate the
system will not serve as the proper foundation for a Lackey claim of inordinate delay.
However, it is worth noting that this sort of defendant would rarely experience delays
reaching the extraordinary levels discussed at length here. As Aarons indicates, a long
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delay often impliesthat th e capital case was a very difficult one to prosecute against a
particular defendant, and that the decision to seek the death penalty in that case was
probably debatable from the beginning.84 Likewise, “the delay in carrying out the death
penalty also may reflect a consensus by several actors in the capital litigation process such as subsequent prosecutors, juries, state and federal judges, and governors - that the
defendant is not truly deserving of death” due to possibilities of subsequent rehabilitation
or new emerging facts.85 Indeed, it seems logical that the so-called “slam-dunk” capital
cases are not the ones which defendants could effectively stretch out across decades, no
matter how many frivolous appeals are filed. That said, as long as capital defendants are
acting legitimately in pursuing and exhausting review of their own life or death
determinations, they should not be excluded from the protections of the Eighth
Amendment.

Citing to a report made by the American Bar Association, Aarons concluded that
“when there has been an inordinate delay between the imposition of the sentence and the
pending execution, the state is usually directly responsible for a great part of the delay.” 86
Most delays are procedural failings on the part of state court systems, and can be
attributable to ineffectiveness of counsel appointed, slowness in processing of records,
cumbersome state policies and procedures, and uncertainty regarding constitutional and
habeus law, among other things.87 None of these causes of the delay are directly
attributable to the prisoner, whose psychological trauma has often only increased as his
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confinement drags on, the faint prospect of an overturned death sentence flickering
unpromisingly with each new phase of litigation.

The Illinois Supreme Court decision People v. Simms underscores the need for
courts to take the reasons for delay into account when deciding whether or not the Eighth
Amendment supports granting relief. In 2000, that court rejected most of an inmate’s
claims—including his Lackey argument—but reversed and remanded to hold an
evidentiary hearing on a claim that perjury had affected his death penalty sentence.88
Chief Justice Harrison forcefully dissented to draw direct attention to the Lackey issue
lingering above this prisoner’s 15 years on and off of death row during “extraordinarily
protracted” litigation. During this time period, the inmate’s death sentence had been
vacated three times for procedural error and each time the state had sought to reinstate it.
The Chief Justice was unmoved by the notion that death row inmates must suffer such
long delays as a consequence of their own decision to avail themselves to the appeals
process.89 He conceded that such reasoning would have force if many claims reaching
him were largely frivolous attempts made only with the intention of postponing
execution, but this was rarely the reality in the Illinois court system; there, most capital
cases dragging on longer than a decade were addressing prosecutorial errors or issues of
ineffective representation, and not merit-less arguments brought by defendants. Of course
the state must have the opportunity to retry defective cases; however:

[t[here must be a point … at which the court steps in and says enough is
enough. Beyond a certain number of years and a certain number of failed attempts
by the State to secure a constitutionally valid sentence of death, the litigation
becomes a form of torture in and of itself. It is as if the State were holding a
88
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defective pistol to the defendant’s head day and night for years on end and the
weapon kept misfiring. It may eventually go off, but then again, it may not, and
the defendant has no way to be sure.90

Here, where there was at least some evidence that the state had deliberately sought to
procure the prisoner’s death sentence by knowingly using perjured testimony, the absence
of authority allowing the court to grant relief posed significant problems.

Courts must be able to take the reasons for the delay into consideration when
determining if an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred. Courts would be remiss not
to recognize the unconstitutionality of extraordinaryperiods on death row which are
largely attributable to the state.

C. How to Legislate Around Death Row Syndrome and Competing Concerns

Whereas the speedy trials problem was somewhat mitigated by statutes of
limitations on the prosecution of certain crimes, no state or federal legislation yet
establishes a statute of limitations addressing the point at which a punishment becomes
cruel and unusual once a prisoner has spent an abnormally long time awaiting execution.
Silence in this area might be understood in light of Justice Thomas’s assertion that
“consistency would seem to demand that those who accept our death penalty
jurisprudence as a given also accept the lengthy delay between sentencing and execution
as a necessary consequence.”91 The system changes each year, and this logic may help
explain why states are hesitant to fix specific statutory limits for death row incarceration,
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lest prisoners continually appeal and then claim they’d been too long incarcerated.
However, this line of reasoning is countervailed by the danger of extraordinary delays
due in large part to state failings, discussed above. Again, the state has a very real stake
in establishing such legislation where death row populations are swelling, delays are
reaching unprecedented levels, and the system is growing increasingly clogged. Much
like the balancing courts will have to do, legislatures attempting to provide statutory
governance of cruel and unusual death row delays must address these competing
interests.

Dwight Aarons has suggested thatthere are four common objections to death row
syndrome/Lackey-type claims which explain why petitioners have had little success in the
American context: 1) the inmate caused the delay; 2) it would be unfair to other death
row inmates to recognize the claim; 3) recognition of the claim would disrupt the
administration of capital punishment; and 4) the appropriate remedy for inordinate delay
is to apply for executive clemency.92 He asserts that these qualms are not rooted in a
realistic understanding of the death penalty litigation process, where in actuality, lengthy
delays are more typically the result of the state’s failure “to vigorously respect the rights
of capital defendants,” and “to carry out the execution as aggressively as it sought and
obtained the death sentence.”93 Either way, Aarons’ premises are instructive in any
attempt to fashion legislation that seeks to properly balance competing values. I propose
the following guidelines for crafting legislation on the state level to ensure the Eighth
Amendment is upheld.
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1. Legislation must guard against the possibility that an inmate could
cause his own delay, but it also must provide for Eighth Amendment
relief when a state is primarily responsible for that delay.

We have already concluded that it seldom happens where a prisoner aggressively
litigates frivolous claims and then charges that the delay in his execution violates the
Eighth Amendment. In those few instances where an inmate could do that, however, then
providing for a length of delay triggering mechanism in state statutes—such as the outerlimit one proposed above for courts—would help guard against this danger. Establishing
a presumptively inordinate delay at twice the national average would weed out those
litigants seeking to manipulate the system
, because it would rarely if ever be the case tha t
such claims wouldsurvive for such an extraordinary length of time. If a litigant sought to
continually raise “frivolous” claims and was successful to the point that he had managed
to last on death row for over two decades, then chances are that those claims were not
really all that frivolous to begin with and there was probably some more serious defect in
the proceedings.

That said, legislation must provide for relief when an inmate has spent at least this
amount of time on death row due to failings on the part of the state. This will mostly be
the case when this claim is raised. In such instances, legislation should provide for life in
prison instead of prolonged exposure to death row. Legislating in this area will have the
effect of making states more careful in seeking the death penalty in the first place, while
providing incentive to conduct their capital proceedings more diligently.
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2. Legislation must apply equally to all prisoners.

An Eight Amendment challenge must apply with equal force to all inmates on
death row. Objectors to the availability of this kind of relief allege thatit is inherently
unfair, given the possibility that if two prisoners were sentenced to death on the same
day, varying durations of appeals proceedings could mean that only one of them will
have the opportunity to raise this claim. That argument is not very persuasive in light of
the arguments in favor of this challenge, and unfortunately it only highlights the
arbitrariness which inevitably characterizes the entire system of capital punishment, not
this claim specifically. Aarons responded to this by reminding objectors that “throughout
the law … such demarcations exist. These lines mark the difference between, for
instance, what facts state a cause of action or by when a party has to file his legal claim.
The criminal law is not exempt from this line-drawing.”94

While legislation can attempt to make this claim equally accessible to all death
row prisoners by establishing a universal length-of-delay presumption, collateral review
procedures will still be exhausted at different rates from case to case. The only way
around this is to reform capital processing systems and attempt to streamline the way
different courts across the state approach these types of cases. Legislators might agree
that this might entail an overhaul of the entire system.95
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3. Legislation must preserve the safeguards that seek to maximize
efficiency within the administration of capital punishment.

If we assume that delays are largely borne out the state’s desire to be
painstakingly careful before determining to carry out an execution, and that long tenures
on death row are just a function of the system’s many safeguards to ensure efficiency,
then there is concern that this kind of claim would lead to shoddier litigation where the
state would rush towards execution. Certainly this kind of scenario would be
counterproductive to the underlying rationale for the Eighth Amendment claim.

Aarons proposes that the solution to this is to require that after such delay, the
state must prove its need to now carry out the execution.96 Placing this burden on the
state would closely resemble the procedural requirements now in place for executing an
individual who has recently declared himself insane while awaiting execution. “Similarly
to insane capital defendants, inordinate delay claimants are challenging a legal
classification into which they entered after the commission of the capital offense. The
state should prove that the defendant is no longer within that class of defendants before it
executes him.”97 Along that same line, providing for such a claim should not mean that
prisoners are armed with any fewer avenues for appeal. All of the safeguards currently
operating to protect death row litigants should remain in place to ensure the integrity of
the system where the stakes are so high.
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4. Legislation must maintain appropriate alternatives.

Some opponents suggest that clemency is the remedy for those prisoners seeking
review of their death sentence because of mitigating or intervening factors. They contend
that there are other systems in place to address the problems wrought by inordinate
delays. The problem with this reasoning is that clemency fails to adequately address
many of the issues included herein and is not even granted very often anymore, meaning
that clemency is not really a significant avenue of relief for capital defendants.
Furthermore, “capital defendants who have been on death row for an inordinate length of
time are not immune from the political aspects of the clemency decision” especially since
length of delay has rarely had any impact on the decision to grant relief historically. That
said, legislation should nonetheless continue to provide a clemency appeal option for that
very narrow set of cases that might be able to benefit from it, but it should not presume
that clemency adequate fulfills the function that an Eighth Amendment inordinate delay
challenge does.

5. Legislation must address the other causes of death row syndrome.

While excessive time spent on death row awaiting execution is the hallmark of
this claim, the actual conditions on death row markedly contribute to the psychological
deterioration of inmates. Length of delay and conditions of confinement are inextricably
linked in the death row phenomenon, a sentiment made particularly apparent in the State
v. Ross case from Connecticut which is discussed in Section II. There, the former
warden testified that the death row environment was much like being confined to a
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submarine or cave. The affidavits there also showed that the attitude of the guards
contributed greatly to Ross’s psychological infirmity, as they repeatedly made comments
that could have been construed as encouragement to commit suicide.

Statistics figuring into the amount of time a death row inmate must spend in
solitary confinement also implicate notions of cruel and unusual punishment, especially
where solitary confinement methods were not initially designed to accommodate for
prisoners now spending in excess of two decades on death row. Nick Yarris, a man who
was exonerated by DNA evidence after spending 23 years on death row in Pennsylvania
for a crime he didn’t commit, reported in the documentary “After Innocence” that for the
first two years of his confinement he was not allowed to speak at all.98 All of this
testimony only begins to scratch the surface of what the actual conditions on death row
entail, and the Eighth Amendment significance when these delays are unusually
protracted. Since death row residencies are reaching unprecedented levels and will
continue to, legislators must be proactive about addressing each of these elements
specifically and providing for more humane conditions of confinement.

Conclusion
Death row syndrome is a concept with a great deal of legal importance, especially
since death row tenures in excess of decades are becoming increasingly commonplace
across the United States. This phenomenon is particularly significant given that it is
recognized elsewhere in the world and foreign governments are growing more reluctant
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to extradite criminals here because of the potential for extraordinary delays before
execution. In the absence of outright abolition of the death penalty, courts and
legislatures should evaluate this Eighth Amendment claim as one of first impression, and
determine that the constitutional question is raised at least when a prisoner has spent
more than twice the national average amount of time in death row confinement. Courts
and legislatures must then carefully balance competing interests to provide for relief
where it is necessary.
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